Three years ago, the Lebanese army fought a fierce battle against an armed organization called (Fath Al-Islam),at Nahr Al-Bared , the second largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon, a few kilometers from the Lebanese-Syrian borders. The leader of the organization was called Shakir Al-Eissa, a Palestinian national. He was joined by hundreds of Palestinians, Lebanese and other Arab nationals with the aim of fighting Israel and liberating Palestine. But later, when they occupied the camp with all its fortifications, hiding places, shelters and large quantities of weapons prepared by PLO during the 1970s and 1990s to fight Israel, it was found out that they were members of the (misled group). Their aim was to undermine the Lebanese government. They carried out bombing operations, killed dozens of civilians, attacked a number of institutions and robbed several banks to finance their organization.
This paper is an attempt to go through so many researches and articles written about the three months and a half war won by the Lebanese army during which several hundreds of its officers and soldiers were killed or injured. We will bring to light the military plans adopted during that war. Overlooking the other political, social and psychological analyses, that battle was the fiercest fought by the Lebanese army ever since its inception. It exposed it to the glare of local and international media which covered the battle minute by minute.
Although the army had suffered from serious deficiencies in necessary arms, ammunitions and military equipment needed for the confrontation, it was able to clean the camp from armed elements that included professional snipers, explosives experts who booby-trapped almost everything, including cans of beverages and animal carcasses …etc. But the army, after 105 days during which they suffered heavy losses, killed half of the militants whereas the other half were detained and are still being court-martialed. Others fled, the most distinguished being Al-Eissa. The praise received by the Lebanese army from some countries, experts and foreign armies was remarkable, particularly regarding its professionalism and its avoidance of a large number of casualties among civilians. In this topic, we depend on the views of three experts: the two retired brigadier generals Nizar Abdul Qadir and Elias Hanna in addition to the military and strategic affairs researcher Riyadh Qahwaji. The three prepared several researches and articles that covered all the dimensions of the battle ,albeit only focusing on the military plans.
In the aftermath of the bombing of two mini-buses that carried passengers at the town of (Ain Alaq) in eastern Beirut, and the accusations that the bombing was carried out by Fath Al-Islam, the army piled up its pressure against that organization by intensifying their deployment around the refugee camp according to the following arrangement: an infantry brigade from Al-Abda to the brigade on the main international road and another tank-supported brigade on the Tallat Bahneen overlooking the camp. The deployment of the 5th infantry brigade could be summarized by the authorization of a tactical column to deploy around the camp and another to carry out patrols from (Deer Ammar) to the Lebanese-Syrian borders till Wadi Khalid together with a third tactical column to be deployed at known locations on the Lebanese-Syrian borders to stop arms trafficking and the infiltration of terrorists into Lebanon.
Early in May 2007, the organization threatened to carryout suicide operations if the army maintained its tough measures at the entrances of the camp or around it. The army command ordered the 5th brigade around the camp to reinforce its positions and adopt a clear defense plan. They also warned Fath Al-Islam to remove their new positions facing the army positions. If not, the army would attack and uproot those positions. But the leadership of the terrorists did not comply with that warning. Under this escalation which had started in early May, the commander of the army, major general Michael Suleiman decided to begin the enforcement of the warning and launched the uprooting operation of Fath Al-Islam from its positions overlooking the army positions or the highway. The operations department ordered the Elite Battalions that would launch the attack to conduct reconnaissance operations at the platoon, detachment or squadron levels. It also ordered the intelligence department to conduct the necessary contacts to ensure the political cover at the domestic, Arab and regional levels while focusing on ensuring the biggest possible Lebanese support for the operation.
Fath Al-Islam organization had already tightened its military control on Nahr Al-Bared refugee camp, forcing Fath Organization to pull out to the center of the camp and deploy south of the river. At that time the terrorist organization did not face any difficulty in controlling the camp after assaulting the Fath of Al-Intifadah which had controlled the camp since 1983.
During that time, the command of the domestic security forces which was investigating the (Ain Alaq) crime, decided to carry out a raid on two apartments occupied by suspected organization members at the 200 and Al-Zahiriya streets in Tripoli in the early hours of May 20. It was said that the army command had no knowledge of the incident.
After the shooting between the attacking force and the armed elements, the army forces deployed in the city of Tripoli were mobilized. This was followed by a confrontation between an army position near the national stadium and a group of terrorists that resulted in the death of two soldiers from the 7th battalion and three terrorists ,whereas two more members of Fath Al-Islam were captured.
The 5th battalion command deployed at Al-Qadeiat airport had, meanwhile, declared that the battalion’s positions around Nahr Al-Bared camp were attacked by armed gangs from 4:00 a.m. on May 20th.
Immediately after that contact, the operations department at the army command, represented by operations commander, brigadier general Francois Al-Haj, ordered several military units to get ready for movement to the Northern Region. The 5th battalion was also ordered to stick to the Tallat-Bahnin and Al-Mahmarah. But it was later discovered that the terrorists had already succeeded in occupying the military positions from Al-Abdah to Al-Mahmarah, tightening their control along the road between those two positions.
Sensing the dangerous situation, the army command ordered the 5th battalion command to use tank and 155mm. artillery fire to protect the remaining positions. These measures were taken after Prime Minister Fuad Al-Saniorah had been contacted and informed of the situation. The army command also informed Saniorah of their readiness to use heavy arms fire against the terrorists. The premier’s reaction was positive, giving the army command a free-hand to take whatever actions deemed necessary to recover the army positions.
The army’s positions at Al-Abdah and Talat Bahneen stood fast, whereas fire positions fell in the enemy hands, including the position at the Muhamarah entrance. The terrorists also controlled the entire highway. As a result of this heinous and sudden attack, the army lost 27 martyrs. It seemed that Fath Al-Islam had planned to surprise the army, not only at Nahr Al-Bared but also at the city of Tripoli as well as the region between Deer Al-Bulmond and Al-Galmoon, where a patrol from the 7th brigade was ambushed by the terrorists resulting in the death of 5 soldiers. Thus the losses rose to 34 martyrs.
Mobilization of forces and preparation for assault:
Putting the military forces on alert, the army command issued the orders for advancing towards Nahr Al-Bared. The vanguard force was Al-Maghaweer corps followed by a second column from the 3rd intervention corps. Synchronized with this, was the advance of a battalion from the 2nd brigade towards Kasrawan and Jubail to replace Maghaweer Al-Bahar force currently deployed in the region. The command also issued orders to the 7th brigade to advance through Zaghreta province and Beirut-Tripoli highway in order to encircle Al-Badawi refugee camp. Also, a few naval pieces were ordered to join the operations.
Immediately after reaching the approaches of the camp, Al-Maghaweer corps mounted a fierce attack, culminating in the restoration of all centers and effective control of the highway. Also, the 5th brigade restored Talat Al-Muhamara. In the meantime, the naval boats engaged the militants as part of a maneuver to distract the terrorists and confuse Fath Al-Islam’s command, forcing them to fight on all the fronts at the same time. The restoration of the military centers and controlling the highway ended at 3:00 p.m. on May 20.
The mobilization of forces continued with the dispatch of the airborne corps from Beirut and Maghaweer Al-Bahar corps advanced towards the camp in preparation for the subsequent decisive battle.
The elite force was joined by units from several infantry brigades, the 1st and 2nd armored corps, the 1st and 2nd artillery corps, the corps of engineers and logistic support. The encirclement was completed at mid-day, May 20, and preparation began in earnest for the decisive battle.
Entrenched deep inside the camp, Fath Al-Islam was able to utilize the fortifications, shelters, arms and munitions depots as well as the supplies available at the shops to wage a long war that may go on for several months. With a population of about 35,000 people, the camp was actually a middle-size city and a fortified fortress. The PLO has in fact spent huge funds on building operations room, shelters during the period of the 1970s and 1980s. The overcrowded buildings and narrow streets (one meter to 80 centimeters wide) were an impediment to the use of machinery. They also did not provide enough firing range for the direct heavy artillery and tank shelling. Another disadvantage was that the militants could mount snipping operations from the high-rise buildings around the camp. The occupation of these buildings also provided a protective shield for the old camp against long-range tank and artillery fire.
After the restoration of the military centers, the army forces began to engage the militants’ forward centers, waiting for the approval of the final plan to assault the camp and uproot the terrorists of Fath Al-Islam and other sympathetic elements. Having ensured enough fire power at all entrances of the camp, the assault plan has now begun to take shape. The army command’s three options for the decisive battle were:
1) a quick operation to storm the camp from three directions by the elite units, mindful of the possible heavy loss of lives and equipment.
2) Intensifying the blockade of the camp, gradually evacuating the inhabitants and mounting attrition operations against Fath Al-Islam, but it could take 10 to 12 months to succeed.
3) Mounting phased -attack operations and advancing gradually to control the camp. This would be followed by tightening the grip around the old camp and placing it under heavy shelling to corner the terrorist in a specific zone before storming the camp.
Thoroughly scrutinizing the three options, the army command ruled out the first option due to the possible high loss of lives. The second option was ruled out because of the long duration of the operations, mindful of the political and popular pressures to stop the operations.
So, the third option was approved and called the phased tactic, or mounting small, frequent assaults, firmly advancing towards the intended goal and avoiding as much as possible the loss of lives among the military units and the civilians.
The military operations:
The army had to wait for the evacuation of the civilians before using its heavy weapons against the militants. 2000 people left the camp in two days followed by a gradual daily rate of 1000. As this effort continued for 10 days, the terrorists tried to prepare the largest number of booby-traps at the new camp to inflict a heavy loss of lives among the attacking force, effectively hindering the advance of the elite units. The command ordered the elite force to mount a three-pronged assault from the north, east and southeast directions, backed by direct and indirect tank and artillery fire. Joining the battle from the southern direction, the 5th brigade used Talat Bahneen as its firing base.
The direct and indirect artillery shelling and tanks’ fire played a pivotal role in providing support for the attacking force, crippling the terrorists and destroying their fortified locations. The corps of engineers was also vital for opening roads before the attacking force, particularly with respect to dismantling of booby-traps, or planting their own traps for the terrorists. The bulldozing contributed to the opening of roads, allowing the advance of machinery and tanks to back the assault operation.
As he camp represented a fortified fortress it was natural to use heavy weapons, tanks and mortars in the battle against the terrorists. Also, the army was conscious of the shortage of munitions for M/48, T/54 and T/55 tanks as well as 155mm artillery and 82mm and 120mm mortars.
Contacts by the army commander succeeded in procuring equipment and ammunition for the battle from such friendly countries as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the U.A.E., the US and the European community. Urgently needed, these equipment and munitions were transported to Beirut airport. This enabled the forces participating in the assault to maintain the same pattern of fire power up to the end of the battle, while Syria enforced previous agreements with the army.
The troops were supplied with some of the best protective suits in the world. Also, patrols were supplied with nocturnal vision binoculars, 20 pieces for each patrol. This is in addition to special cameras to uncover snipers and direct accurate fire against them.
Air operations:
Initially the military helicopter’s only role was to mount reconnaissance sorties over the camp. This is in addition to the evaluation of seriously wounded people to Beirut hospitals.
This role was upgraded later to take part in shelling and destroying the terrorists’ centers.
In a pioneering initiative, the air force armed some of the helicopters with special racks to carry and launch two 250-kilogram bombs originally designed to be launched by (Hawk Hunter) jet planes.
In a later stage and due to cooperation between the air force and the engineering group, a 400-kilogram bomb was developed and mounted under the helicopter’s belly after undergoing tests at Al-Taiba firing range. Also, Elgazzel helicopters were armed with guided missiles to attack the heavy weapons sites, particularly the machineguns targeting the naval pieces or even the helicopters themselves. However, the missiles were not heavily used due to their high cost. The helicopter shelling focused on the destruction of fortified buildings and shelters. Had the army possessed fighter planes it could have resolved Nahr El-Bared battle as early as its first month. Nonetheless, the army command did not wait for the world community’s response to its request for reinforcing its air force, but resorted instead to its limited potentials and succeeded in developing a helicopter-bomber, a feat unmatched by any army world-wide.
A group of air force technicians, in cooperation with the corps of engineering used obsolete and laid back munitions as assault weapons largely contributing to the intensity of fire power and ultimately increasing the pace of the attack against Fath Al-Islam militants. The Lebanese air force technicians have retrieved 250-kilogrm and 400-kilogram bombs purchased by Lebanon more than 30 years ago and used them on Miraj 3 and Hawker Hunter fighter planes. They have also modified the UHIH helicopters, increasing the height of slides used for landing, creating ample space for mounting the bombs under the helicopter’s belly.
The technicians have also removed the Miraj planes launching systems and mounted them under the helicopters’ bellies, connecting them with the pilot’s firing button. The helicopter navigators used the GPS for directing their bomb attacks. This of course includes the determination of the plane’s take-off point, the target’s creation, plane’s altitude and wind velocity. After successful tests, the helicopter-bomber entered the battlefield, achieving high-precision hits (a 10-meter-diameter circle from target) and sometimes direct hits.
Experts consider the air-dropped bombs more lethal than bombs fired by tank and field artillery, particularly if the mission is to destroy buildings, as was the case in Nahr Al-Bared. While the tank and field artillery needed several days of constant shelling to destroy one building, the armed helicopter was able to destroy more than one building by mounting few raids in one day. The naval boats have taken part in the operations since May 20, effectively sealing the coast. The navy was fully prepared to support the land operation, opening fire to prevent infiltration from the west. It was also able to arrest all those who tried to flee, particularly on September 2, the last day of the battle.
The communications have been satisfactorily provided by FAIRTEX and the closed mobile network used by the army. For effective field control, the army operations prepared aerial maps and buildings within the blocks are given specific numbers.
With respect to medical evacuation, an advanced evacuation and treatment center was set up. Wounded persons used to be taken to hospitals in Akkar and Tripoli, while serious cases were transported by helicopter to Beirut hospitals such as Rezik Al-Roum hospitals. A team of specialist surgeons would be waiting for them after being informed by telephone about their condition by a doctor at the hospital’s advance evacuation location. The Lebanese army’s engineering corps has played a major role in the battle, constructing roads for advancing troops, evacuation missions, and removal of mines and setting up basis for tanks. This is in addition to providing cover for the army.
In cooperation with Al-Maghaweer corps, the engineering corps constructed the hill that overlooks the old and new camps, contributing to the effective siege of the terrorists. The rubbles of the demolished homes were used in building the hill. The challenge facing the corps was to open the road from the river to the camp’s highest point to ensure evacuation of the wounded and continuous munitions supply.
A ditch excavator and a tracked bulldozer were used for opening the road. The prime and most difficult objective was to provide a location for tank fire at the highest point of the hill whose construction took three days to complete.
Speaking to the army magazine, a captain in the engineering corps said: this pivotal incident had an important impact on the troops’ morale. The incident occurred at the entrance of the old camp where Al-Maghaweer force entered to occupy a building. One of its men was killed in an ambush. Two other men were martyred in the operation to evacuate him. Other attempts to enter the camp from other directions also failed due to ambushes. A decision was taken to encircle the camp and occupy three adjacent buildings for protection. First we controlled the first building and then moved to the other two buildings. A group of five soldiers entered the (7-story) building containing the body of the martyred soldier but the building collapsed and we faced the problem of evacuating six martyrs. Using civil defense equipment and operating under heavy shelling, it took seven days to evacuate them. Although the father of the first martyr asked us not to evacuate his son if that meant suffering more losses, we persisted because we don’t leave our martyrs in the battle ground.
The army command took all the necessary parallel measures.
The army command has taken all the necessary precautions, including the reinforcement of the military capabilities at the entrances and around all the Palestinian refugee camps, to forestall any destabilizing acts or military moves sympathetic with Fath Al-Islam militants at Nahr Al-Bared. The effectiveness of the precautionary measures was evident in the army’s prompt and decisive response when it clashed with a militant organization in Ein Al-Helwa refugee camp. The army achieved 90% preparedness during the battle of Nahr Al-Bared. Some units were transferred from the south to fill the vacuum in Beirut and the governorates of Ba’abda and A’aleh as the 3rd intervention force was moved from Beirut to NAhr Al-Bared.
To preserve the security preparedness in the deployment areas, the military police was charged to fill the void in greater Beirut. This clearly indicates that the security preparedness in various regions was maintained at the same effective level.
The security and military operations were not confined to Nahr Al-Bared alone. Military and intelligence operations were implemented in several regions to chase the terrorist cells, particularly in Tripole, Qalmoon, Beirut, Sidon and Beqaa’. These cells were either affiliated to Fath Al-Islam or other sympathetic groups. Mole terror cells not connected to Fath Al-Islam have been uncovered and weapons, explosives and booby-trapped cars have been confiscated.
The army’s heavy losses in the prolonged battle were due to the fact that the conflict zone was highly populated and the armed militants used the civilians as human shields. Also the nature of the war was new to the army.
In this so-called fourth generation war the enemy is from outside the state’s fabric and could not be resolved through political means and traditional negotiations. Also, victory could only be gauged at the end of hostilities, particularly as the die-hard militants inside the camp are bent on fighting to the bitter end.
Malik Al-Qa’qour