The deep battle concept is a relatively new strategic and mobilization idea spawned by the fast technological advances in armament systems requiring a similar development of fighting tactics and armed conflicts management. The deep battle is based on the air-land battle formulated by the training command and the American army’s fighting tenets in cooperation with the air forces’ tactical command. Add to this the follow on forces’ attack tenet, the tern used by the NATO forces command in Europe.
The deep battle concept is essentially aimed at engaging the enemy’s reserve and follow -on forces, whether in the attack or defense battle, simultaneously with fighting the enemy’s first formation troops. Thereof, the “deep battle” is based on using two main elements: fire and maneuvering. This will provide the best circumstances to ensure success of fighting the enemy’s first formation troops, destroying its follow on forces at their location and preventing them from supplying the first echelon’s forces. This in turn will resolve the battle in our favor with the least possible losses.
Deep battle levels:
The battle could be conducted on the following three levels:
1. “The deep battle” on the tactical level: it is planned and conducted by the brigade or regiment. It could also be planned by the field army command but conducted by the regiment or brigade. In most cases this battle would be within the depth of the brigade’s daily task, or 20 to 25 kilometers.
2. “The deep battle” at the mobilization level: it is planned and conducted by the field army command as part of the mobilization operation and is executed by at least an armored or mechanized brigade within the depth of the army’s direct task, or 30 to 40 kilometers. In most cases it is backed by an airborne force no less than squadron in size.
3. “The deep operation” on the strategic level: it is planned by the armed forces’ general command- or the general staff- and is conducted by the field army command under the supervision of the general command within the framework of the strategic operation. It is executed by more than one armored or mechanized regiment, backed by no less than 2 airborne battalions. Its depth may extend to 50 – 60 kilometers.
The concept and objective of the deep operation/ battle
The concept and objective of the deep operation/battle include preventing the enemy from mounting successful fighting actions as well as denying the enemy the initiative advantage or restoring and maintaining it. This requires intervention in the fighting rate of enemy forces, disrupting the fighting actions of its forward and rare battle formation elements and destroying them in stages. This should be executed simultaneously and under close cooperation among land, air and airborne forces. Also incorporated are vast maneuvers under air and artillery fire covering all the scope of the battle theatre (in the forward and rear lines and at the flanks). The fire should be directed against near forward lines of the enemy, its reserve units and follow on forces at their concentration areas deep into the battle theatre and before mounting their attacks.
The aim of the two battles – at the forward lines and in the depth – is to confuse the enemy and cripple its thinking, preventing it from utilizing its reserve and follow on attack forces in the depth zone or tie down these reinforcements, preventing them from mounting counter attacks against our forces that successfully penetrated the enemy defenses and delaying their advance towards the combat zone of the enemy’s first-echelon. This will give our forces ample time to destroy it using maneuvers and fire. Striving to strike a balance between “maneuver” with its horizontal and vertical dimensions and fire power using artillery, missiles and fighters, the concept lays particularly emphasis on fire power being the effective factor in crippling enemy movement, silencing it initially and destroying it later backed by forces’ maneuvers. The maneuver concept is encapsulated in the method of concentrating the fighting forces’ maneuvering, be that the land units assigned to encircle and besiege the enemy from the flanks or the air-borne and sea-borne forces engaging the enemy from the rear, targeting the enemy’s weak points. The aim is to achieve tactical and mobilization advantages to use effective fire power against vulnerable enemy forces. This also incorporates the utilization of modern and technologically advanced armament systems.
Deep battle’s advantages:
The deep battle’s advantages include securing and maintaining the initiative advantage and achieving high fighting action rates. The mechanized regiment attack rate when fighting against immobile enemy defenses may average 20 kilometers per day, leading to the occupation of the enemy’s forward defense zone at the end of the day. This means the penetration of the enemy’s defense barriers and subsequently its forward defenses. This is in addition to defeating its first-echelon and repelling and destroying its counter attacks. This consumes much of the valuable time of the attacking regiment. Then the follow on attack force has to complete the destruction of the enemy counter attack followed by another penetration of the enemy’s forward defense zone. However, adopting the deep battle method achieves swift and decisive success in the first stages of the fighting through the early destruction of the enemy’s follow on and reserve forces in the depth of the front. This will prevent the enemy from mounting a counter attack, facilitating and increasing the rate of attack by the first-echelon units of the attacking regiment. This will also lead to the occupation of vital targets in the depth, affecting the balance of enemy forces and denying it the ability to move and maneuver. This is in addition to the psychological impact resulting from the appearance of our forces in the enemy’s depth, crippling the thinking of the enemy commanders and leading to the collapse of its forward and rear defenses. Such mingling of our forces with the enemy forces and our first formations’ penetration of its forward defenses shall prevent the enemy from using its mass destruction weapons against our forces. Also, the presence of our forces deep into enemy lines- whether through encircling operations and laying siege to its flanks, or through the actions of our air-borne forces – will enable our forces to destroy the enemy’s artillery and missile units. This would deny the enemy the ability to provide fire power assistance to its defending forces and in turn lessen our forces’ losses. This would also lead to the destruction of enemy air defense units, allowing our air force (fighters and helicopter gunships) unrestricted freedom of movement. Moreover, our actions in the enemy’s depth will lead to the destruction of its command and control centers as well as its transportation network, making the enemy lose its command and control abilities.
In case of fighting actions at the strategic level- i.e. a deep operation – the enemy targets may include its airports, logistic depots, strategic command centers, transportation plans and communication networks and any other valuable targets within the depth zone.
Deep battle requirements:
The deep battle requires furnishing accurate, detailed information about the enemy’s mobilization depth, i.e. up to at least 40 kilometers including the location of its follow on and reserve forces as well as their type (mechanized or armored) and the availability of anti-tank missile. This is in addition to the enemy’s intention to use these missiles for mounting counter attacks, their movement axis and direction of launching such counter attacks. Add to this the order of artillery units in the depth zone which camouflage and support their movement. This is in addition to continuous monitoring the order of enemy reserve units and their movement during the battle for penetration of the forward defenses of the enemy’s first-echelon as well as determining the exact timing for mounting a counter attack. This is in addition to accurately pin-pointing the location and nature of particularly important hostile targets in the depth zone – artillery units, air defense, command centers, bridges and fly-overs – whose occupation or destruction would shatter the enemy’s main defense structure, causing it to collapse.
The topography of the land should be accurately examined to determine the best maneuvering methods for our follow on and reserve units in order to encircle the enemy’s defensive locations and reach its flanks and rear zone, not to mention the determination of the best locations for our air-borne and sea-born forces deep into enemy lines.
There is a need for providing highly flexible and highly mobile forces – armored or mechanized – capable of out-maneuvering and destroying the enemy. Such forces should have a high shock force-maneuvering, armor and fire power – backed by air-borne and sea-borne troops covered by fighter planes and artillery fire and armed with anti-tank missiles capable of destroying enemy armored units as they attempt to counter the assault.
Also, there is a need for qualifying and refining the skills of the commanders to be able to take and implement urgent decisions as well as seize and maintain the initiative. The commanders would also be trained on how to face difficult situations such s being isolated from the rest of our forces for hours or day while deep into enemy lines. They should be able to control their zones until they are reunited with the rest of our forces.
Attention should also be given to a sufficient fire power comprised basically of the air force (fighter planes and assault helicopters), surface-surface missiles, artillery units and missile launchers, capable of hitting the enemy’s mobilization depth as well as responding to fire power requests from our forces that conduct distant encircling and embracing assignments or that receive air-borne troops deep into the enemy’s depth. Such efforts require the deployment of forward monitoring officers capable of requesting and correcting artillery and missile fire power and using helicopter and drone surveillance stations to request or correct the fire power in the depth to help our forces operating at the enemy’s flanks and rear zone.
It is vital to achieve air supremacy over the battle-deep operation theatre to prevent enemy fighter planes from interfering in its favor. It is also needed to ensure freedom of movement for our fighter planes and helicopters to support and assist our forces’ fighting actions and avoid the interception of our assault helicopters carrying the air-borne troops. Air supremacy is achieved by allocating the right number of helicopter fighter planes to operate over the battle air space. This is in addition to allocating fighter bombers to bolster the land forced fighting actions. This in turn requires the deployment of forward air management elements to request and direct the air effort against the right targets at the right time. It also calls for achieving coordination and cooperation between the air force and ground fire power units – namely, surface-surface missile and artillery. The anti-tank reserve should operate under the commander of the regiment conducting the battle from the start.
This effort is closely associated with efficient assistance from the electronic war elements throughout the deep operation/ battle, incorporating its two components: wireless and radar reconnaissance and wireless and radar interference. The electronic war effort should be intensified during the enemy reserves and follow on forces fighting stage. The aim is to paralyze its command and control centers, preventing its radars from obstructing our air force actions. Therefore, the uncovering of the locations of the enemy’s command and control centers and radar stations should be linked to their shelling by our fighter planes, artillery and missiles to provide the best circumstances for the success of the main battle in the depth. This may also call for allocating special fighting groups to undertake sabotage mission against the enemy’s command centers and its air defense units in the depth in case of failure to destroy them by fighter planes and artillery.
It is also vital to ensure efficient, stern and continuous command and control actions on all battle formation elements throughout the operation’s defense depth for the entire duration of the battle. This includes the first-echelon’s defensive units on the front lines and the follow on and reserve units conducting the encircling and enveloping assignments before engaging the enemy in the depth. Add to this the air-borne and sea-borne units landing in the depth as well as the surface-surface missiles and artillery units, anti-tank reserve, regiment’s air defense units and special assistance air force. This in turn requires the provision of numerous mutual means of communication, main and reciprocal command and control centers moving with the follow on and reserve units conducting the fighting in the enemy depth. Such centers should be able to operate under enemy electronic interference. This is in addition to the provision of helicopter surveillance and command centers at the disposal of the commanders in case they want to inspect locations in the depth of the battle to personally steer the operations at critical stages of the battle requiring their close supervision. The commanders should also have a free hand in taking decisions at various levels.
Ground and air reconnaissance assignments should be efficiently carried out, focusing on the enemy’s follow on and reserve forces, main fire power sources, command and control centers and air defense means. In planning our forces actions we should not be contented with the reconnaissance information about the enemy’s pre-battle preparations. The reconnaissance effort should continue throughout the battle to monitor the enemy’s fighting activities, enlisting the fighting units’ cooperation in garnering such reconnaissance information. Cooperation should also be achieved between all reconnaissance elements at all levels and the specialist reconnaissance elements.
A plan should be worked out to mislead the enemy about our forces intentions to use the follow on and reserve units, creating unreal movements by part of our forces away from the main zones intended for using our follow on and reserve forces. This also includes structural airborne forces’ actions away from the real areas designated for landing the airborne forces. The aim is to direct the attention of the enemy forces and fire power to unreal zones. Add to this the first echelon brigades success in quickly penetrating the enemy’s front lines defenses at their weakest point and occupying technically important zones in the near depth will mislead the enemy to believe that these forces are conducting the main thrust against its defenses, thus distracting it from monitoring the maneuvers of the follow on units heading towards its depth.
It is also important to protect the near part of our forces against expected enemy actions in the depth. This calls for allocating the necessary forces and means and determining the responsible sectors, the possible targets and the method of protection. Also important is the adequate preparation of the contact lines adopting the vital principle that each sub-unit in the depth is responsible for defending itself and should not rely on other units to come to its rescue.
The administrative restrictions should be reduced to allow the forces operating against enemy follow on and reserve units to maneuver freely and respond quickly to the main fighting units. This is in addition to the provision of basic necessities such as fuel and ammunition.
The concept of deep operation /battle in attack utilizing the fire power of the air force, surface-surface missiles and long-range artillery strikes could be mounted into the enemy depth (enemy’s second defense line), including the reserve units concentrations, follow on forces, command and control centers, air defense means and artillery units within the depth zone. The aim is to destroy or silence these forces and tie them down and impale them in their positions as long as possible. This will prevent the enemy from mounting counter attacks against our forces in the enemy’s forward defensive lines. At the same time, preparatory artillery shelling is mounted against enemy units, artillery batteries and fire sources in the forward defense lines. The objective is to tie them down in their places. The artillery shelling should continue against the enemy forward units and in the depth as long as needed to cover the follow on and reserve units’ movements to encircle and embrace enemy forces until reaching their action lines in the depth.
Our first echelon’s forces penetrate the enemy’s forward defenses under artillery cover. The aim is to tie down and impale enemy units in the confrontation as the follow on and reserve units move to encircle one or both enemy flanks and reach the depth to engage its follow on and reserve units there. This will prevent the latter from interfering in the first echelon’s battle in the forward defense zone.
If our air-borne units conduct operations in the mobilization depth (20-25 kilometers) in favour of the follow on and reserve units, the latter should urgently contact the airborne force which could not confront the enemy’s armored units for more than 5-6 hours. Immediately after contacting the airborne unit, battle forces – the follow on and the airborne units – should seek to besiege the enemy and destroy it in its zone or as it moves in a showdown battle.
Important consideration for the success of the in depth attack:
The follow on forces seeking to engage and destroy the enemy reserves in the depth should properly study the topography of the land and determine to what extent does it allow them to mount operations to encircle the enemy if its flanks are vulnerable, or take advantage of any loopholes in its forward defenses to mount its attack. If such loopholes are not available, the enemy’s forward defense barriers should be pin-pointed and penetrated to be used as a base for mounting the attack on the defenses in the depth to destroy the enemy reserve units. The first echelon’s forces may be charged with breaching the enemy defenses to allow the follow on forces to mount their attack on targets in the depth. While trying to achieve this, our forces must take into account the possibility of having to fight and destroy near-by enemy reserve units, preventing them from moving to plug the gap.
Isolating the enemy’s follow on and reserve units - impaling them during our first echelon’s fighting actions – is a prime job for our air, missile and long-range artillery forces as well as the airborne units. Dispatching a mechanized or armored brigade – an advance detachment or even an enhanced tank battalion to pre-empt enemy reserves actions and occupy a suitable blocking line in the enemy’s depth could hinder enemy movement until the arrival of the rest of the main force of our follow on unit. Such an action is appropriate for protecting the follow on and reserve units in enemy depth.
Our follow on units fighting in the enemy depth may be charged with occupying a vital target in enemy depth before its destruction or restoration by the enemy – such as a strategic bridge to be used by the troops or a strategic factory or a power plant or an oil field … etc – therefore these forces will be in a race against time to beat the enemy to reach and secure this target.
In all cases, the commander of the regiment mounting attack in enemy depth should always keep a reserve force, particularly after sending his follow on and reserve units to encircle enemy flanks or penetrate its defenses to reach the depth. By sending the follow on force’s brigade to fight deep into enemy lines, all the regiment’s units would be fighting in the same echelon, a precarious situation due to the lack of a reserve force to repel possible enemy surprises. In such a case, the regiment’s commander should withdraw a tank or mechanized battalion from the first echelon’s brigades engaged in the confrontation to be set aside as a reserve force, while the first echelon’s brigades are still required to double their attack rates on enemy defenses to complete the penetration and make contact with the follow on brigade attacking the depth. This will protect the brigade’s flanks and expedite the collapse of the enemy’s defense structure.
The follow on units’ planned maneuvers to reach enemy depth and engage its reserve force should avoid any delay or attrition during their advance – such as mountain passes, water barriers and sand territory – where enemy artificial barriers would be in abundance, including mining of roads or explosions to cause mountain slides or mounting tactical chemical or nuclear strikes against the follow on units in difficult zones. This requires early reconnaissance operations in the follow on units’ advancing course and the early protection of their movement by dispatching engineering detachments to remove mines and explosive charges. Also measures should be taken to protect the units against the enemy’s possible use of weapons of mass destruction. Add to the above the early occupation of bridges and flyovers. Such measures are important for the success of the follow on units’ mission. The plans should take into account that the power of the follow on force – normally an armored brigade – would achieve superiority over the enemy’s reserve force to encountered and destroyed. In the event that a comparison of forces does not achieve the required numerical superiority in tanks and armored vehicles, the follow on brigade should be bolstered by anti-tank missiles capable of destroying large numbers of enemy tanks. This will cause the enemy to lose its superiority and allow our follow on brigade’s tanks to continue the destruction of the enemy reserve’s track vehicles. Thus, the commander of the follow on brigade should prepare various scenarios to confront emergency situations that may creep up while fighting in enemy depth. He should also select the right territory for his main battle with the enemy reserves, which at the same time ensures the best use of his forces without being involved in any secondary fighting actions at the expense of executing his principal assignment of destroying the enemy reserves, sticking to his territory and the strategic targets thereon as well as the method, time and place for making contact with the airborne and seaborne units in the depth.
The first echelon’s units should strive to cover the whole range of the confrontation – or the biggest possible part thereof – to prevent the local enemy reserves from maneuvering on its flanks. Also, the confrontation’s consolidating offensive should be planned and executed as if it is the directon of the main thrust. The units should be keen to achieve more than one penetration in the direction of the local enemy reserves, seizing targets and commanding locations in the near depth. Therefore, it is essential to include an armored element in each of the first echelon’s brigades fighting in the same echelon. Each brigade in the first echelon should focus its effort on the penetration sector. It is preferable that the first echelon brigades’ two penetration sectors operate side-by-side, forming together one penetration sector of the regiment in which its units’ main thrust is focused.
To protect the follow on brigade’s movement in the enemy’s depth before engaging the enemy’s reserves, and as part of the joint planning of the airborne force’s operations, these special nature forces must be tasked with delaying and obstructing the enemy’s reserves’ advance from their concentration zone until they are forced to engage our forces. This effort includes planning ambushes and planting mines on the enemy flanks and the destruction of bridges and flyovers expected to be used by the enemy. This means that the airborne unit should include engineers capable of providing technical assistance in this field. It should also include secondary units armed with anti-tank missiles and short-range surface-surface missiles (GRAD – up to 20 kilometers). This is in addition to air defense elements armed with short-range surface-air missiles capable of repelling low-flying enemy fighter planes. Meanwhile, the follow on brigade advancing in the enemy depth should dispatch a battalion as an advance force 5-6 kilometers ahead of it to quickly link with the airborne battalion and protect it from enemy reserves attacks. The latter should in turn dispatch 3-5 kilometers before it a detachment comprised of tanks and armored vehicles to act as a forward guard for it.
In the light of accumulative engagement between our forces’ forward guard detachments and the enemy, and our forces’ forward battalions and the enemy, as well as the time consumed by each engagement, (1-2 hours), enough for the arrival of the main force of the follow on brigade (advance battalion not included) to the forward engagement zone, the line where our forces forward guard detachments would meet the enemy will mostly be the same engagement line between our forces advance troops and the enemy as well as the same engagement line between our follow on brigades’ main force and the enemy reserves’ main force. Consequently, it is important from the start to determine this line in a way suitable to our forces, tasking the forward guard detachment and the forward battalion to reach and immediately occupy it, paving the way for the rest of the brigade’s main force to destroy the enemy thereon. The fighting on this line should be maintained until the destruction of the enemy reserves’ main force is completed, or it should be held until the arrival of the rest of the regiment’s units (the first echelon’s brigades) fighting in the enemy’s forward defense zone. Thus, the timing of the follow on brigade’s movement and dispatch to the enemy depth should be accurately pondered, bearing in mind the enemy reserves concentration zones, its intentions to use them, the nature of territory, the important strategic targets in the advance axis and the attack zone as well as the nature of enemy defenses thereon. With regard to the accurate timing for moving the follow on brigade to the enemy depth, it is vital to take into consideration the timing for executing the airborne landing in favor of the operation, allowing the quick contact between the two forces.
For the best use of fighter plane, artillery and helicopter fire power, the forward battalion should include a monitoring artillery officer to request, mange and correct the friendly artillery fire to protect our forces against such friendly fire. The vehicles and locations of the follow on brigade’s units should be marked. This is in addition to using specific electronic codes between the friendly fighter planes and the brigade’s secondary units to protect them against fighter planes and helicopters’ friendly fire. Meanwhile, fire power assignments should be distributed among the friendly fighter planes, assault helicopters and artillery in line with the nature of targets, the extent of the threat they pose and whether they are within the artillery range. The main burden may be on the artillery fire units, the fighter planes and helicopters to silence destroy and hinder the movement of enemy reserves in the depth, particularly if the battle circumstances prevented the movement of the follow on brigade to the depth at the right time. Such a delay may make it mandatory to put off or cancel airborne operation.
The concept of the deep operation/ battle in the defense:
The concept of the deep operation in the defense is based on engaging the enemy’s follow on and reserve units tasked with developing the attack, in the depth of our defenses and territories. Such engagement synchronized with managing the defense battle against the enemy attacks first echelon brigades being fought in our forces’ first defense zone. This also involves the use of long-range fire power means, such as fighter planes, surface-surface missiles, artillery, long-range missile launchers and assault helicopters. The best timing for moving our follow on forces to engage enemy reserves is after the success of our first-echelon’s forces in repelling the enemy attack at our forward defensive positions and before the enemy moves its reserves to support its first echelon’s attacking force. The important objective of our follow on brigade is to isolate the enemy reserves from their first echelon, engaging it within its deployment zone and giving our secondary units in the near depth the opportunity to mount successful counter attack against the enemy’s just repulsed first echelon forces, destroying them and restoring the defense conditions to their previous status.
So, the deep operation in the defense could be divided into the following three simultaneous battles:
a. The battle for repulsing the enemy’s first attacking echelon. (The repelling battle).
b. The enemy reserves destruction battle. (The depth battle).
c. Protecting the depth of our forces’ defenses. (The rear battle).
Due to the importance and seriousness of this type of battles in the defense, they are planned at the level of the field army command of the regiment undertaking the defense against the main thrust. However, the divisions deployed in other directions are allowed to work out their plans. The attacking enemy’s reserve could be early handled and destroyed at the forward limit of our forces’ defenses. This could be done simultaneously with repelling the attacking enemy’s first echelon forces without waiting for the success of our forces’ first echelon in the repelling battle. Meanwhile, the enemy’s reserve could also be handled and destroyed after the success of the repelling battle waged by the units of our forces’ first echelon against the enemy’s first echelon. The decision hinges on the nature of the enemy’s reserve force and its location on the battle ground in relation to its first echelon’s forces, the enemy’s intentions to use it as well as the extent of our forces success in the battle to repel the enemy’s first echelon and isolate it from its reserves. Our forces’ successful destruction of the enemy reserves could be utilized to send our forces on the attack in the enemy’s depth if it has no nearby strategic reserves. Our forces success in this deep battle hinges on two principal factors, first: the ability of our fire power means (bombers, helicopters, artillery and missiles) to mount accurate fire hits against enemy reserves in the depth. Second: the extent of our forces’ ability to conduct special airborne forces operations in the enemy’s depth capable of interfering with the enemy reserves as they try to approach our defenses, inflicting heavy human and material losses on them, impaling its advance. Such interference should also compel the enemy reserves to develop their attack in the depth of our defenses and isolate them from enemy’s first echelon units. Thus, they will be prevented from interfering in favor of their first echelon’s battle as long as possible until success is achieved in both the repelling battle and the destruction battle being conducted by our first echelon’s units. The successful destruction of the enemy reserves also depends on the prior, accurate determination of the expected battle ground to prepare the fire power plans and the airborne operations, in addition to the prior deployment of engineering barriers therein. Also, the prior destruction of the attacking enemy’s command and control centers and units as well as confusing its battle management by the electronic war means could also help to swiftly resolve the battle in our favor.
As our follow on units will be preoccupied with engaging the enemy reserves in the depth, our first echelon units assigned to the first defense zone could form secondary armored units to serve as nearby reserves at the level of each brigade in the first echelon to mount local counter attacks, taking advantage of the successful repelling operations to finish off the destruction of the enemy’s first echelon units. This will complete the realization of the repelling operation and boost our follow on forces’ battle to destroy the enemy reserves. The anti-tank missiles unit is the nerve center in our forces’ management of the battle to repulse and destroy the enemy’s attacking armor, whether at the first echelon or the reserves levels. Therefore, it is preferable to bolster the airborne unit by enough anti-tank missiles to enable it to discharge its assignments in the enemy depth and protect the unit while it is isolated in enemy depth against attacks by its armored reserves.
In the case that the field army plans and implements a deep battle by its follow on divisions, it is not permissible for the first echelon’s defensive division in the army’s forward defensive zone to move its follow on units outside the forward defense limit. The aim is to preserve the defenses cohesion and strike the mobilization balance when executing the deep battle outside the defenses. Also, when the army plans a deep battle at the mobilization level, it is not permissible for first echelon’s regiments engaged in the main defense to plan a deep battle at its level in order to preserve the cohesion and balance of the defense. However, the regiment engaged in a secondary defense is allowed to plan a deep battle at its level provided that it does not compromise the stable and balanced defense at the mobilization level. In the case that the follow on units in the defense are moved to mount deep battles against enemy reserves, the higher level (the field army command) should supply these follow on units with all intelligence and fire power assistance, fighting protection and logistic support available as part of the field army command’s resources.
• In the case of moving the follow on units to mount a deep battle against enemy reserves, it is important that such a decision should be taken only after our first echelon units’ success in repelling and tying down the enemy’s first echelon’s attack, be that at the depth of the first defense zone. This is in addition to containing its attack by encircling the main force of the enemy’s first echelon within a specific zone of the first defense area and striving to destroy it by direct or indirect fire. The force movement should also lead to the success of the airborne operation in the enemy depth. However, it is preferable that the airborne force’s mission be to handle the enemy’s command and control centers, its artillery units location and its air-ground defenses with a view to confusing the enemy’s control over its offensive battle and denying its long-range fire power sources the advantage of providing fire support to their forces fighting at the first echelon or the reserves. This will also give freedom of action to our air force to support the fighting actions of our follow on forces in the enemy depth. To distribute the command and control responsibility for the fighting actions of the units of the regiment engaged in a deep battle against the enemy reserves, the commander of the regiment assumes control over actions of the follow on forces earmarked for executing the deep battle, while the chief of staff of the regiment assumes control over the fighting actions of the first echelon units defending the first defensive zone as well as managing the first echelon’s repelling battle against the enemy. Throughout the stages of the battle, our first echelon and follow on forces should keep enough reserves at the brigade, regiment and army levels to preserve the defense balance.
Battle formation and fighting grouping for a mechanized or armored regiment mounting attack in enemy depth
a\ A regiment’s battle formation should preferably be as follows:
1. First echelon: near battle force comprised of 2 mechanized infantry brigades to destroy and impale enemy’s first echelon.
2. Follow on unit: deep battle forces comprised of enhanced armored brigade to destroy enemy reserves.
3. Reserves: rear battle, ensuring mobilization balance and development after success, enhanced mechanized infantry battalion.
4. Advanced or encircling detachments: comprised of armed battalion from the follow on brigade.
5. 1-2 regiment artillery groups comprised of 2-3 artillery battalion/ long-range missile launcher in favor of deep battle and first echelon battles. This is in addition to brigades’ artillery groups totaling 10-12 artillery battalions.
6. Air defense brigade.
7. Automobile, anti-tank missile reserve for regiment comprised of 12 launchers, in addition to 3 anti-tank missile reserves at brigade level.
8. Airborne anti-tank missile reserve at the disposal of regiment commander, comprised of 4-6 assault helicopters armed with (hell fire) anti-tank missiles.
9. 2-3 mobile barriers detachments comprised of engineers to monitor mines.
10. 2 movement protection detachments comprised of engineers to pave and open roads, clear mines and explosive charges.
11. Airborne and seaborne force when operating along the coast, comprised of one commander battalion.
12. Specialist reserves (reconnaissance reserve, anti-WMD reserve and transportation reserve …etc).
13. Logistic support units.
b\ regiment attack zone and confrontation:
1. First echelon regiment (close proximity):
If the regiment operating in the field army’s first echelon, the regiment’s attack zone widens to achieve maneuvering ability, reaching up to 15 kilometers, while its attack confrontation extends up to 10 kilometers. However, if the regiment is charged with impaling the confrontation within the framework of the field army’s management of a deep battle, the attack zone could extend to 20 kilometers.
2. Follow on regiment (deep battle):
If the regiment operates as a maneuvering force for the field army, its attack zone should be specified. But if the regiment is executing the deep battle alone as part of the field army’s attack formation, its attack zone should not be specified but its attack direction or operation zone should be designated.
3. Reserve brigade (rear battle):
If a brigade operates as an army reserve to protect the field army’s rear, its responsibility sector or zone should be designated.
c\ penetration sector:
A penetration sector should be specified for the forces mounting an attack against the enemy’s first echelon (close proximity battle). The penetration sector’s confrontation depends on force size, enemy defenses nature and the rest of the battle formation elements. A brigade’s penetration sector may reach 2-3 kilometers and even 4 kilometers if the Special Forces are moved to engage enemy reserves during the first echelon’s breach.
d\ regiment’s main thrust direction:
The direction of the main thrust of each of the first echelon’s units (close proximity battle) and the follow on unit (deep battle) should be specified. Such a designation should be as part of the penetration sector which ensures the destruction of the enemy’s main gathering (destruction, maneuvering and development) as part of the commander’s decision for managing the operation.
e\ regiment reinforcement means:
The support earmarked for the regiment depends on its role, place and mission in the field army’s mobilization formation. This is in addition to the nature of the enemy’s defenses, its units in the depth, its battle formation and its vision for managing its defensive battle, as part of the regiment’s attack zone.
The regiment charged with the attack operation in the depth is reinforced with the following units: 2 bomber squadrons sorties and 2 anti-tank helicopters sorties (from army anti-tank reserves) and from the air force effort earmarked for the army. This is in addition to the air force’s implementation of the rest of its assignments, including the provision of air protection, air reconnaissance and airborne missions and transportation. Reinforcements from the land forces include one automobile air defense missiles brigade (sam 6), airborne battalion, surface-surface missiles brigade, 2 artillery brigades, missile launchers, automobile anti-tank projectiles battalion, up to 2 helicopter squadrons armed with anti-tank missiles (forming airborne anti-tank reserve), 2 engineering battalions, roads detachment, smoke battalion, chemical and radiological reconnaissance detachment, land clearing detachment, mixed electronic war group (wireless reconnaissance and interference).
f\ Organizing cooperation:
Organization cooperation is important in executing the fighting actions of the deep battle due to the diversity of the regiment’s fighting formation and reinforcement. This in turn highlights the need for coordinating its fighting actions to successfully achieve the regiment’s fighting mission with the least possible losses and in a record short time. This is particularly so with respect to aspects related to air force fighting action, surface-surface missiles and distribution of target. Add to this the fighting actions of the airborne and seaborne units and the advance detachments moved to link up with the airborne force.
The most important cooperation and coordination aspects include: targets and zones not to be exceeded by fire power, recognition methods among forces and fighting formations that reinforced the regiment, particularly the air force and assault helicopters to spare the land forces any inadvertent shelling by air fighter planes. This happens when operating in the same zone against the same target, dividing the target to each type of forces or assigning each type specific time to work on the target. Also cooperation could be achieved between our forces engaging the enemy’s first echelon (close proximity battle) and our forces engaging its reserves in the depth. This is in addition to the accurate determination of our forces’ actions directions in the enemy depth and their maneuvering methods to repulse enemy reserves in the depth. In the event of the follow on unit advancing towards the enemy depth through the penetration hiatus in the enemy’s first echelon, the organization of cooperation focuses on how our first echelon’s units will protect the penetration gap through which the follow on units will advance to engage enemy reserves in the depth. Also cooperation should be achieved with artillery units around the targets to be attacked by the troops and the targets to be attacked only by fire power to preserve the concentration of the forces engaging the enemy amid numerous hostile targets.
The commanding officer of the unit fighting in the depth should have numerous perceptions about the emergency situations that may face his forces in the enemy depth. Relying on intelligence and reconnaissance reports about the enemy and its possible actions in the depth, the role of each element in the regiment’s battle formation will be determined to respond to enemy actions.
Deep battle management procedures: when the regiment mounts the attack and advances from the depth, the commanding officer and his staff will take the necessary measures to occupy a forward waiting zone on lone with the commander’s vision and on the deadline set in the special mission. Also, according to the deadline fixed before the attack, the force advance from the waiting zone to the engagement line, taking all the necessary measures to protect the advancing force.
However, if the regimen’s attack is in close proximity with the enemy, measures shall be taken to regroup the forces and switch locations as the situation warrants and as per the commander’s decisions and operation’s plan.
To advance from the forward waiting zone to the engagement line, the regiment should push ahead of it elements to protect the advance. It should cross the control lines on the designated advance tracks, covered by the protection elements and fire power. Regardless of whether there are enemy elements before the engagement line or not, the line shall resemble the regiment’s responsibility for its fighting actions. During the advance, the command centers shall spearhead the main force to be in charge of the situation. Meanwhile, the commanders shall continue to stress their forces assignments as the troops advance. Normally, the regiment’s units would cross the line applying the “pre-battle” formation or the actual battle formation if confronted by main enemy elements at the engagement line.
(X hour) is the deadline for the first echelon’s attack – close proximity battle – against the enemy’s first echelon, synchronized with the movement of the follow on force – deep battle – to engage enemy reserves in the depth. In the event of executing the deep battle through the penetration hiatus at the enemy’s first echelon’s positions, coupled with the movement of the follow on force through the penetration gap, then the (X hour) shall be fixed as per the situation and the decision of the regiment’s commander.
When using the air force and artillery fire power to prepare the stage for the attack, it should cover the enemy’s entire defense zone including its first echelon and reserves positions, targeting the enemy’s most threatening gathering at our first echelon’s penetration sector, its artillery positions, command and control centers and air defense mediums. This is in addition to the enemy’s reserves positions in the depth. Similar fire power coverage should be used as our follow on units approach enemy reserves’ positions, simultaneously with the confirmation of the information about the enemy reserves conditions by the advanced reconnaissance detachments as well as the aerial reconnaissance. Special attention should be given to the destruction of targets close to the landing area of the forces’ airborne unit so that they should not interfere with its operation, effectively isolating the area. Under fire power cover, the first echelon attacks the enemy’s first echelon – close proximity battle – striving to swiftly penetrate enemy defenses to reach its depth and destroy local reserves at their concentration zone. They would also operate on the enemy flanks and corridors to encircle and isolate its defenses, the first echelon’s forces may also be tasked with impaling the enemy’s first echelon to prevent it from maneuvering giving the follow on force the opportunity to move to the enemy depth to engage and destroy its reserves.
The decision may be taken to move our follow on force to destroy enemy reserves at their concentration zone in the depth by maneuvering or encircling one or both defensive flanks if the operation theatre is favorable, or by advancing through defenses’ gap opened by the first echelon’s units if the land topography is not favorable. In this case, our follow on force shall advance in the form of pre-battle formation (successive detachments), speedily advancing towards enemy reserves under preparatory fire cover –or one artillery barrage – according to the size and nature of the enemy: occupying defenses in the depth, or keeping its forces in their concentration zone or advancing in file formations. In such a case the battle will take the form of a confrontation. Our follow on force will advance in a battle formation, mounting successive or synchronized attacks on enemy units and distributing fighting assignments on its battalions, each battalion handling a separate enemy unit to destroy it in a specific zone or direction. The artillery, air force and helicopters shall provide fire power cover. Also, a forward detachment should be dispatched to quickly link up with the airborne or seaborne unit preventing any new enemy reserves in the depth from interfering in the enemy reserves destruction battle.
After moving the follow on battalions to engage enemy reserves, it will be inevitable to form a reserve force for the regiment. Such a force would be no less than a tank or mechanized battalion reinforced with anti-tank missiles to protect the regiment’s rear and face unexpected developments in enemy depth.
The regiment’s commanding officer should accurately designate the timing and direction of the defeated enemy reserves’ withdrawal towards the dept of their territory. In such a case, the reconnaissance elements should determine the enemy’s true intentions behind this withdrawal. If the enemy intends to regroup the reserves in the depth, recompense the losses and resume the fighting, the commander of the regiment should prevent the remnants of the reserves from doing that, blocking the withdrawal track and destroying the reserves. The enemy may also be planning to drag our forces into a pre-planned killing pocket. Therefore, our forces should be alert to such plots.
Upon completion of the assignment of enemy defenses penetration, reserves destruction and reaching the designated line, the regiment regains its fighting efficiency and recompenses its losses in anticipation of a fresh assignment. Priority must also be given to reinforcing the defenses on the newly acquired line, preparing to repulse any hostile counter attacks by the enemy strategic reserves. A typical example of the deep battle is exemplified by the Kuwait liberation war (desert storm, March, 1991). Many of the deep battles’ new air-ground principles have been practically applied in the Kuwait liberation’s ground war (desert storm that began on Feb, 24. The principles adopted by the alliance included the initiative, agility, depth and synchronization. The planning has achieved all the principles. All the Iraqi echelons in the theater’s tactical depth have been placed under the direct impact of the alliance’s maneuvering and fighting actions. This necessitated the synchronized engaging and shelling of the Iraqi forward forces at the first and second defensive zones, the artillery positions in-between, the mobilization reserves concentration areas, the follow on forces as well as Republican Guard regiments in the rear, the command and control centers, the air defense positions …etc.
The vital tactics of the “air-ground” battle were aimed at avoiding attrition battles, attacking enemy’s weak and vulnerable points, preserving a smooth battle ground and forcing the enemy to move in the required direction. This is in addition to preserving the continuity of operations using all potentials and enhancing nocturnal vision.
The important continuity objectives included: expectation and merging, response and development. All these goals have been realized. However, the success of maneuvering and preservation of high operations’ rates has been achieved only after an intensified air war of attrition.
The US-led alliance in the war against Iraq was able to use the advance warfare tactics and training method (air-ground) as well as the technological advances made by the U.S. and its European allies during the pre-Gulf war era. This has been more effective because the Iraqi forces were contented with adopting the immobile defense principles and concepts, effectively helping the alliance’s ground forces to achieve high advancing and attacking rates in Iraqi depth.
The comparison of forces between the alliance and Iraq has drastically changed after the U.S. 7th corps was sent from Germany to the Gulf region. This is in addition to the first army regiment, the 2nd navy infantry, the 3rd air force wing infantry and other reinforcements. The flow of these forces continued till January 17, 1991. The 7th corps was comprised of 120 tanks and 1046 BRADLY M.2 armored vehicles. Meanwhile, the 18th was comprised of 738 tanks and 647 BRADLY M.3 armored vehicles, the Middle East campaign, navy infantry No:1 was reinforced with about 75% from 4 to 17 regiments. Sea borne brigades was doubled from one to two brigades. This is in addition to major increases in the British and French ground forces. The French light armored 6th regiment was placed under the command of the U.S. 18th corps to protect the alliance forces’ left flank.
At the ground offensive deadline, the US has already amassed a military force in the Gulf region comprised of 527,000 men from the four military branches. Its land force was comprised of 2 corps from the army as well as 7 army regiments two armored cavalry regiments and 7 air force brigades and the command of the two corps. The army had 1878 tanks and 2201 armored vehicles. The US ground forces also included a navy infantry force comprised of 2 infantry regiments, their air force flanks and reinforcement elements.
The U.S., British and French forces totaled 258,710 men, 11,277 track vehicles, 47,449 wheeled vehicles and 1619 fighter planes. Saudi Arabia deployed 118,000 men, 550 tanks, 179 planes and 400 artillery pieces. Egypt contributed 40,000 men, one armored division, one mechanized division comprised of 350 tanks, 750 armored vehicles and 145 artillery pieces. Meanwhile, Syria contributed one armored regiment composed of 240 tanks, 250 armored vehicles, 100 artillery pieces and 20,000 men.
The ground forces’ attack formations were as follows:
1. The 18th corps was stationed in the alliance’s zone west of the Saudi-Iraqi neutral zone at the western most tip. It was comprised of 24 mechanized regiments, the 197th mechanized brigade attached to the regiment, the 82nd airborne regiment, the 101st airborne regiment, the 6th French armored regiment, attached to it was the 2nd brigade of the 82nd airborne regiment and the 3rd armored cavalry regiment. The corps artillery was comprised of 2 brigades, 18th army avian with helicopter. It operates as a deep encircling force in the far west.
2. The 7th corps is stationed in positions to the east of the 18th corps and along the Saudi-Iraqi neutral zone up to the beginning of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border in Wadi Al-Batten. It was comprised of the 1st armored regiment, the third infantry brigade from the 3rd infantry regiment as an attachment to it. This is in addition to the third armored regiment, the 1st armored cavalry regiment, the 2nd armored cavalry regiment. However, the corps artillery was comprised of 4 field artillery brigades and 11 air force brigade “helicopters”. It operates to form an encircling force to the west of Wadi Al-Batten with the 18th corps and in the direction of the main thrust.
3. Joint force command (north): stationed at the alliance positions along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, east of Wadi Al-Batten. It is comprised of the Egyptian 3rd mechanized regiment, the Egyptian 4th armored regiment, one Egyptian lightning regiment, Syrian 9th armored regiment, Syrian special forces regiment, Al-Mothana force from the Saudi 20th mechanized brigade, the Saudi 4th armored brigade, Saa’d force from two mechanized Kuwaiti brigades, one infantry battalion from Niger, one Saudi air force battalion and the Saudi 15th artillery battalion. It fights in a confrontation form in the direction of Kuwait.
4. Navy infantry campaign force No: 4: stationed along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border to the left of the joint forces command (east), and to the east of the joint forces command (north). It is comprised of: the campaign command element from an intelligence and reconnaissance group, a civil affairs group, US navy construction group, 2nd navy infantry regiment, attached to it the first brigade (tiger) from the US 2nd armored regiment and the 1st navy infantry regiment.
5. Joint force command east: stationed at the alliance positions along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border up to the Gulf coast (it is comprised of Omer contingent) a Saudi infantry brigade, airborne U.A.E. infantry battalion, (Othman contingent) a Saudi mechanized brigade, mounted Omani infantry battalion, Bahraini infantry detachment, a Kuwaiti infantry brigade (Tareq contingent), Saudi navy infantry battalion, a Senegalese infantry battalion, a Moroccan infantry regiment. This is in addition to command force east comprised of one Omani mechanized battalion, a Bangladeshi infantry battalion, a Kuwaiti air force battalion, 2nd Saudi artillery battalions and a Saudi engineering force.
6. Special Forces control center (COCCENT) made up of the Special Forces 3rd group and the Special Forces 5th group.
The joint command organization of the alliance battle formation used to back such a gathering of force, and allow the US army’s central command to clearly designated the assignments, the borders between the attack stages’ lines (depth of fighting missions) the fire power cover. It has greatly resolved the command and control problem in a multi-national force and reduced the threat of friendly fire incidents. The Saudi army has undertaken the responsibility for coordination among the Arab forces and the remaining small multi-national ground forces, resolving the language organization, training, equipment and administrative problems faced by the different alliance armies.
At the same time, the U.S. has provided liaison officers from the army, Special Forces, air force, air liaison officers and a communications detachment to request navy artillery cover. The navy infantry also provided liaison officers. Satellite communications were also made available. This effort was vital for the ground attack as the traditional land communications were neither efficient nor secure.
e\ during the air campaign, the alliance succeeded in completing a wide-scale maneuver by the 7th and 18th corps to the west. General Schwarzkopf’s mock plan for the two main corps tasked with mounting a major strike deep inside Iraq required them to wait for moving to the final assault locations in zones to the west of Wadi Al-Batten until the success of the air force in achieving air supremacy. The aim was to deny Iraq the advantage of knowing the direction of the main strike targeting its depth, leading it to focus its efforts on defending Kuwait, unaware of the nature of the developments taking place. Nevertheless, the plan gave the 7th and 18th corps only two weeks to execute on of the most complicated deployment, advance and encirclement operations in history. The US, British and French forces were supposed to transport 255,000 men, 64,000 track vehicles and wheels for up to 530 kilometers to a point 492 kilometers from Dhahran. The redeployment movements in preparation for the ground war were made during the period from January 17 to February 24, covered by an air campaign. The movements continued around the clock for 3 weeks, with vehicles moving 15 seconds apart. The C-130 has undertaken an extensive transportation effort to the theater to the new zones, flying at low heights to avoid Iraqi radars’ detection. The engineers have constructed a new tarmac along the tap line track, 16 kilometers from the Iraqi border. The planes delivered 5,000 rubber fuel tanks for the armored and other vehicles. This is in addition to another effort concerned with road construction and administrative protection at the zones of operation of the 7th and 18th corps, fulfilling requirements for 60 days of fighting. This included the delivery of 29.6 million meals, 36 million fuel gallons and 114,900 tons of ammunition from Saudi ports to locations west of Al-Batten. A suitable distribution system was created. As for the intricate regrouping operations to build fighting formations capable of achieving their objectives, new commands at the level of corps and regiment were created and supplied with command and control gear to enable quick forward deployment to bolster the advance of the 7th and 18th corps. Also, 6 administrative areas were constructed for the two corps, in addition to four other areas at the Middle East campaign force’s zone in the Kuwaiti border. As a result, a trend has emerged before and after the war to utilize this experience and press for major development of air and sea transportation. This is in addition to the prepositioning of supplies that could be quikly moved and other relevant supplies. However, the best lesson derived from the experience is that the cost-effective method is the sound assessment of the enemy and moving just what is required for the situation instead of undertaking huge operations at far distances across the globe, though the enemy’s strength does not warrant such mammoth efforts and huge costs. It has been proved that the alliance’s build up and movements were based on over-estimating Iraq’s strength. For instance, the US central command estimated that the ground assault would take two weeks followed by four weeks to consolidate the situation and hold the territory, while actually the ground war to repel the Iraqi force from Kuwait and destroy Iraq’s main force did not take more than four days.
j\ qualitative and quantitative comparison between forces: the US central command planners estimated that size of forces at the operations theater before the air campaign was in favor of the alliance as follows: 1.8:1 in men, 1.2:1 in tanks, 1.3:1 in armored and other vehicles, 3.6:1 in planes. However, after dividing these percentages over sectors and the main thrust directions, the planners estimated that the alliance forces’ superiority was 1.4:1 in the direction of the main thrust from the west (the 7th and 18th corps), 1.3:1 along the attack line in the direction of Kuwait. Meanwhile, the superiority of the Egyptian-Syrian force was 1.4:1 and that of the Middle East campaign force was 0.75:1 in relation to the advance of the two Arab forces.
Nevertheless, such percentages were at best quantitative estimates of men and pieces of weapons without referring to the quality and highting efficiency, major factors in determining the outcome of the armed conflict. Military experts say that the assault operations require that the attacking land force should have at least a 2:1 and generally 3:1 superiority to execute a successful assault but the Desert Storm alliance had immense qualitative and quantitative advantages. Also, the alliance adopted a superior fighting tenet in line with superior operations that allowed the alliance to achieve speedy victory. Worthy of note also is that the alliance commands at various strategic, mobilization and tactical levels were able to implement numerous air-ground battle ideas.
The alliance most prominent qualitative and quantitative advantages in the ground war include:
1\ application of war principles and military tenet:
• Initiative: determining or changing the battle course by attack action.
• Agility: friendly forces ability to mentally and materially act faster than the enemy.
• Depth: continuation of operation in available spaces.
• Synchronization: ground force activities arrangements according to time, available space and objective to produce a maximum fighting force at a decisive moment.
2\ focusing on tactics:
• Utilize the joint corps, joint forces and full integration of the abilities of all land, sea and air systems.
• Diversion and focusing of a decisive fighting force using fire power and maneuvering at the right time and place on the battle ground.
• Preserving high maneuvering rates.
• Continuous use of mock operations.
• Striking the enemy’s strategic center.
• Remaining within the enemy’s decision circle, continuously monitoring the enemy, forcing it to take decisions serving our forces, superb action.
• Making numerous synchronized penetrations.
• Decisive use of force, encircling and enveloping the enemy.
• Integrating the use of fire power into the maneuvering concept.
• Integrating the air power of fighter planes and helicopters into the ground forces’ operations, particularly in the special operations.
• Continuous high rates of operations to keep the enemy under fighting and fire power pressure around the clock.
• Avoiding attention battles in tandem with attacking enemy weak points.
• Preserving flexibility of operations on battle ground, firmly controlling its geographic zones.
• Forcing the enemy to move in the required direction.
• Integrating all possible capabilities and potentials.
• Optimum use of nocturnal operations, particularly in limited visibility conditions, to surprise the enemy from unexpected directions.
3\ continuity advantages:
• Prior expectation of enemy’s plan and behavior in the battle, judging by its previous wars experience (Iraqi-Iranian war).
• Merging the forces’ fighting elements with main fire power sources (air force, artillery, helicopters and drones) with the fighting actions of the infantry, armor and Special Forces throughout the tactical and mobilization depth.
• Response: quickly responding to battle circumstances, however difficult they may be, resolving or adapting to them with the least possible losses.
• Creativity: shunning traditional methods and introducing modern fighting systems and equipment into the battle. This is in addition to new fighting tactics to surprise the enemy and weaken its fighting abilities.
4\ upgrading training and fighting methods:
• Training on actual applications of the provisions of the fighting tenet and field service rules.
• Working in closely-knit groups (teams) from various fighting elements of a professional force (reconnaissance, infantry, armor, artillery, Special Forces and air assistance) to implement a fighting mission with specific dimensions.
• Real, joint fighting training for all battle formation elements and levels in an exercise to test the execution of assignments.
• Real, nocturnal fighting training in poor visibility conditions, round the clock for 2-3 days.
• Testing the levels of preparedness when the warning is sounded.
• Training on maintenance and repair as well as administrative and material protecting before and during the battle.
• Using training to test forces’ adaptation with unusual geographical and climate data.
The accumulative importance of the difference in alliance and Iraqi concepts concerning the fighting use of forces and application of operations tactics constitutes the most important lesson drawn from the air-ground battle. A similar lesson lies in the alliance’s actions as regard the operational synchronization between the units of the joint corps echelons. This was distinctly clear in the final preparations for ground assault. The interaction was evident between various elements of the alliance forces to achieve cooperative results, ultimately leading to the successful execution of fighting assignments in the specified time, with the least possible losses.
The alliance’s final plans for decisive battle:
The alliance command’s final plan for the attack called for planning the 18th corps in the far west while the 7th corps executes the penetration and mounts a fierce left hook strike from the center. The 18th corps was supposed to mount a deep encirclement operation from the left flank. The aim was to attack Iraq’s depth to control the main transportation line along the Iraq’s main road No:8, isolating the Iraq’s forces from the Kuwaiti operations theater. The 7th corps should also joined the 18th corps in the encirclement operation from the left before mounting the alliance’s main penetration (the main thrust) to attack the Republican Guard’s forces and commands and lay siege to the remaining Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the west. It should also attack from the east (to the right of ) the 18th corps west of Wadi Al-Batten, penetrating in the northeastern direction. The aim was to decisively defeat the Republican Guard’s forces, prevent the regular Iraqi army from regrouping or mounting any effective counter-attack. Consequently the first armored cavalry regiment from the 7th corps theater reserves was placed on stand-by to repulse any Iraqi counter-attack on Hafr Al-Batten, impaling the Iraqi forces in their zones. Meanwhile, the 24th mechanized regiment and the 3rd armored cavalry regiment from the 7th corps were tasked with quickly advancing in the direction of Busra. They had to avoid most of the Iraqi forward defenses at the operation theater in the first stage of their advance and encircle the Iraqi forces’ mobilization formation at the theater (regiments of the first echelon, follow on force and mobilization reserves) from the west, destroying the three armored and mechanized regiments of the Republican Guard and the additional regiments of the regular Iraqi army.
East of Wadi Al-Batten (to the right of the 7th corps) the joint forces command, north Middle East campaign force, navy infantry and the joint forces command, east, were assigned to attack northward through Iraq’s forward defenses, besieging the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and liberate Kuwait. Meanwhile, the joint forces command, north, had to cut Iraq’s transportation line north of Kuwait city. Moreover, the Middle East Campaign force, navy infantry, was tasked to attack the Iraqi forces at their forward zone, seizing Iraqi locations to the southeast of Al-Jahara city. Also, the joint forces command, east, was charged with attacking the Iraqi forces on the Kuwaiti border near the coast, protecting vital targets along the coast, to the south of Kuwait city. Meanwhile, the seaborne force, navy infantry, as well as British and American marines were to tie down the Iraqi forces along the coast, threatening them with the likelihood of seaborne operations. The north command, Middle East campaign and the east command were to besiege and liberate Kuwait city.
The sequence of the ground attack was carefully planned to confuse the Iraqis: the French armored, light 6th regiment and the America 82nd and 101st airborne regiments were tasked to attack in the direction of the Euphrates and Baghdad at 4:00 from the first day of fighting (daily) to protect the alliance’s left flank. This was synchronized with an attack by the navy infantry followed by joint command, east, near the cost. Meanwhile, the navy infantry campaign force was charged with protecting Al-Wafra city located immediately to the south of the border line between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and linked to the coast with a 1.5 kilometer road. The aim was to tie down and defeat the Iraqi reserves in southern Kuwait, cutting any Iraqi reinforcements from the west. This is in addition to preventing the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and assisting the joint forces command north, and command east in the liberation of Kuwait city.
The plan was based on the following important hypothesis and elements:
1. The 7th corps’ success in besieging and destroying the Republican Guard’s regiments and cutting the Iraqi forces’ withdrawal road northward from Kuwait have determined vital elements of the alliance’s general success. This is in addition to facilitating the success of the 18th corps and other elements of the fighting formation charged with liberating Kuwait city.
2. The battle plan’s deadline depended heavily on the estimates that most Iraqi forces would stick to their positions and their withdrawal would be relatively slow and compulsory due to the nature of the battle. The plan also expected that the Iraqi forces withdrawing from Kuwait would reinforce the Republican Guard’s positions in the rear, which could hinder the 7th corps’s efforts aimed at destroying the Republican Guard and penetrating its positions.
3. The destruction of the Republican Guard’s forces depended on the theory that they would engage and mount counter attacks in the direction of Kuwait to restore the defensive conditions there and destroy the alliance’s penetrating forces. The theory includes that these Iraqi forces will not retreat to northeast before the arrival of the 7th and the 18th corps. All the above hinges on the Iraqi forces’ success in sticking to their defensive positions in Kuwait until the republican guard’s forces mount counter-attacks.
4. The theory that the alliance’s air force was able to block the northward escape routes form the battle field. However all these hypothesis and conclusions partially relied on tying down the bulk of the Iraqi forces at the Kuwaiti Operations Theater, favorable weather and visibility conditions. They also depended on an analysis showing that the Iraqi withdrawal routes were so vulnerable that the air force could play a major role in isolating them.
The Iraqi forces’ speedy collapse (not imagined in alliance’s plan) and withdrawal from Kuwait have spawned important changes in the plan during the war. The alliance’s initial successes and the fear gripping the Iraqi forces have led the alliance’s central command to accelerate the attack schedule of the 7th corps, bringing it 13 hours forward and the alliance was in a race against time to isolate the Kuwaiti operations theater from Basra. However the alliance entertained limited hopes to achieve their end as the Iraqi forces were capable of speedily withdrawing northward to Basra on main paved roads or through usable desert routes. Also the Iraqi forces north and northeast of Kuwait city had not a single reason to be bogged down in a comprehensive battle.
On the morning of the commencement of the ground assault, visibility was curtailed by the rains, sand storms and the rising smoke from burnt oil fields in Kuwait. The weather conditions had a mixed impact on the battle, enhancing the alliance ground forces’ nocturnal war capabilities and the use of infra-red rays, though they had no impact on certain air reconnaissance means such as JSTAR planes. Moreover, the weather conditions have curbed the alliance planes’ interception mission and ability to provide close proximity assistance. They also curtailed the movements of wheeled supply trucks. Despite this problem the alliance’s airforce always had the upper hand, albeit not always fully utilized during the most part of the ground assault.
To speedily close the Kuwaiti operations theater in the face of the Iraqi forces and prevent their withdrawal, the alliance’s central command has issued a string of orders, increasing the 7th corps advance rate and earmarking the first mechanized regiment to enforce it. The order also called for moving the American first cavalry regiment to take part in the fighting on February 26 (previously it was a theater reserve force. Moreover, the 101st airborne regiment of the 18th corps was equipped to mount an air assault to block the northward outlets from Basra on February 27. However, despite all these measures, the joint forces from the 7th and 18th corps could not close the escape route to Basra from the Kuwaiti operations theater at the right time to achieve full victory. Also, the political decision to end the war had been taken without mounting the air assault to the outlets north of Basra. The Iraqi forces had faced a much easier job in escaping northward then if the alliance lightened its siege around them. Had the alliance opted for using the air force to kill large numbers of Iraqi forces, it could have easily achieved this by shelling the Iraq forces along their escape route and around Basra. Meanwhile, many Republican Guard’s forces could have escaped had the alliance not opted for advancing deep into Iraq. One alliance actually destroyed all elements of the Republican Guard’s regiment (Hammurabi) which remained in the theater. The 101st airborne regiment forced many Iraqi units to surrender by closing the outlets from Basra on February 28. However, the idea of sending the alliance’s air force against the withdrawing Iraqi forces could have resulted in a terrible massacre and history would blame the alliance for that.
Summing up, it could safely be said that the left hook strike executed by the 18th and 7th corps deeply encircling the theater’s left flank and inside the Iraqi territory from the south was responsible for the destruction of the main gatherings of the Iraqi army’s strong strategic reserves, known as the “Republican Guard’s regiments”. Constituting the alliance’s main thrust, the strike also prevented the regiments of the Iraqi first echelons in Kuwait from withdrawing westward, ultimately surrendering to alliance forces. This constitutes a clear example of the deep operation/battle and an ideal application of the principles and concepts of the air-ground war”. It has not only succeeded in the liberation of Kuwait (the war’s political and strategic goal) but also in reducing the war’s expected duration from four weeks to only four days, greatly reducing the losses of both sides.
Retired staff major general/ Husam Suwailem